ABSTRACT
The Theaetetus is a dialogue that is being passed on to its readers at third hand, and as Euclid makes a point of mentioning, is the product of memory which is sometimes impaired. Theaetetus’ first attempt to account for knowledge squarely misses its mark and demonstrates his affinity with Meno and other protagonists of the early Socratic dialogues who prematurely attend to first identifying instances of knowledge, before accounting for the specification of what constitutes knowledge, and justifies their referral to instances. Socrates has intimated that the all-or-nothing notion may be abandoned, and replaced by a ‘partial’ notion which was responsible for the Meno Paradox when he auspiciously introduced the preliminary debate on learning. Any philosopher convinced by some version of empiricism, namely that the mind is occupied with thoughts furnished, one way or another, by experiencing the world, will want to hold on to some version of the word-world analysis of language.
