ABSTRACT
The Indian and Chinese economic ascendency differed significantly from that of the late 20th-century powerhouses of Germany and Japan, limited as they were from a simultaneous military expansion by post-World War II settlements. The rising powers' maritime ambitions in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions can be understood in starkly realist, geopolitical terms; according to one analysis, the assumptions and arguments of the ascendants are unmistakably Mahanian. In 2007 assessment, the US Office of Naval Intelligence stated that the Chinese Navy's interaction with foreign countries had four major components: high-level exchanges, ship visits, functional exchanges and arms sales and purchases. Indian analysts were amongst the first to perceive a change of tack in China's use of the PLAN. A New Delhi analysis from 2001 noted that 'port calls to various countries signified the active role of the PLAN in the making of China's foreign policy'. When a rising power faces the existing hegemon there will inevitably a suggestion of rivalry.
