ABSTRACT
A social contract theory holds that at least some features of our moral and legal relationships are products of a social contract. This chapter argues that on plausible interpretations of social contract theory, nonhuman animals such as Kiko and Tommy can be persons with rights. It discusses the classic contractarian thought of T. Hobbes, J. Locke, and J. J. Rousseau and argues that plausible interpretations of contractarianism are compatible with the idea of nonhuman personhood and rights. The chapter also discusses the contractualist political philosophy of John Rawls as well as of contemporary interpreters such as Mark Rowlands and shows that plausible interpretations of contractualism are compatible with, and can even support, the idea of nonhuman personhood and rights. The chapter considers the contractualist theory of political philosopher John Rawls, as well as his contemporary interpreters, such as Mark Rowlands, to show that social contract theory can support the idea of nonhuman personhood.
