ABSTRACT
An intuitionist says “It just seems to be right” because in the end that is all he knows to say for his principle. In the author's experience most people will cite their inability to say more in order to explain their position, but they will not maintain that there could not be anything further to say for moral principles. That is what most philosophers seem to believe. Different conceptions of justification contribute to this position. In the moral sense tradition, the last principle expresses a feeling which rises from a sense sufficiently similar to the physical senses to render the intuition self-evidently true. For the reasonable person would argue the same to himself if, a rationally based not-P coming to hand, he seemed to have a contrary intuition and needed to pick one or the other. It might have seemed to him that his “intuition” couldn’t be mistaken, that P was self-evidently true, but now he changes his mind.
