ABSTRACT
The physical order, because dependent for its perceived qualities on the sense-organs of the percipient, must be the appearance of a more ultimate reality which is non - physical. Berkeley’s criticism is fatal to the identification of this reality with “material substance,” The logical consequence of Berkeley’s doctrine that the esse of sensible things is fercipi would be the subjectivist view that the physical order is only a complex of presentations. Without wasting the reader’s time by unnecessary repetition of our former reasoning, it may be worth while to point out how this thorough-going relativity of the qualities of the physical order to a percipient organ leads directly to the indefinite regress, the apparently invariable consequence of all contradictions in Metaphysics, when we try to take those qualities as independently real. According to Berkeley, nothing but the actual presentations, or “ideas,” in which the percipient subject is aware of the properties of bodies.
