ABSTRACT
This chapter illustrates how a case can be made for the positive normative status of others-centeredness from the perspective of each of the three major approaches to normative ethics. A consequentialist case for others-centeredness is generated by the fact that the expected volume of interpersonal union to be promoted by promoting an interest is greater given just that this interest is another’s than given just that it is one’s own. Assuming that interpersonal unions are valuable, this fact implies that several varieties of consequentialism will provisionally support the normative superiority of others-centeredness. Deontological perspectives provide conceptual space for evaluating others-centeredness as either permissible but not required, or as supererogatory. The appeal some deontological views make to universalizability may also be employed to generate a case for viewing others-centeredness as morally required. Several approaches to defending the virtuousness of others-centeredness from the perspective of virtue ethics are canvassed, with the most attention given to how an exemplarist case can be made on behalf of the virtuousness of others-centeredness by appealing to the trait’s admirability. The chapter concludes by highlighting reasons favoring the positive normative status of others-centeredness distinctively available given a Christian metaphysics.
