ABSTRACT
This chapter highlights an internal problem for McDowell’s epistemological disjunctivism. It begins with an analysis of McDowell’s position, starting from the notion of appearance. It shows the link between the notion of appearance and the notion of warrant. This analysis is conducted from a third-person, externalistic perspective. Then it explores McDowell’s characterization of the perceptual capacity and its exercises, highlighting the link between the notion of warrant and the notion of fallibility of perception. This analysis is conducted from a first-person perspective. Finally, it identifies a possible problem stemming from McDowell’s characterization of the first-person perspective when it is considered against the general background of his theoretical ambitions and aims. In conclusion, it evaluates McDowell’s thesis according to which rational subjects can know, from a first-person perspective, that they possess indefeasible warrants for suitably related perceptual-based beliefs.
