ABSTRACT
The chapter begins by setting out the aims of the book and offering the following characterisation of flourishing. Human flourishing is the (relatively) unencumbered, freely chosen and developmentally progressive activity of a meaningful (subjectively purposeful and objectively valuable) life that actualises satisfactorily an individual human being's natural capacities in areas of species-specific existential tasks at which human beings (as rational, social, moral and emotional agents) can most successfully excel. The chapter also spells out the author's assumptions of moral universalism and progressivism. Most of Chapter 1 is, however, taken up with the task of distinguishing the ideal of flourishing (and education for flourishing) from that of virtue actualisation (and education for good character). It argues that (fully) realising the virtues is neither necessary nor sufficient for flourishing, and that, more generally, flourishing as a concept both is more capacious than the concept of good character and follows a different logic. Although most of the argument is about virtue not being sufficient for flourishing, which is perhaps unsurprising, a more controversial case is also made for the ideal of flourishing being in some ways less demanding than virtuous character – for instance, by allowing for the flourishing of well self-controlled but not fully virtuous persons.
