ABSTRACT
Despite renewed interest in moral role-modelling and its emotional underpinnings, further conceptual work is needed on the logical geography of the emotions purportedly driving it, in particular admiration, emulation and elevation. In this chapter, I look carefully into the dangers of role-modelling (hero-worship, moral inertia and moral over-stretching) and bring those to bear on historical accounts of great role models (by theorists such as Aristotle, John Stuart Mill and William James), and on recent accounts (by William Damon and Anne Colby, and David Brooks). I then explore admiration (as understood by Linda Zagzebski) and Aristotle's emulation and, subsequently, elevation (as characterised by Jonathan Haidt). Although learning from moral exemplarity can, to a large extent, be accounted for on the motivational grounds of admiration and emulation, I argue that we need a concept of elevation (as a kind of moral awe) to account for attraction to transpersonal moral ideals. I explain Aristotle's inability to make sense of people's emotional attachment to moral exemplarity, as distinct from their attachment to moral exemplars. In the final section, I bring to bear insights from another ancient emotion theorist, Mengzi (Mencius), in order to get Aristotle back on track. That section also offers an educational discussion on how emulation and elevation are related to student flourishing.
