ABSTRACT
Chapter Nine introduces the third part of the book by summarizing the argument thus far and drawing out its implications for critical political theory in general. It has been shown that critical norms cannot be rationally justified without implicating ideology, but norms are nonetheless needed. The question at hand in Part Three concerns the normative status of this demonstration. The chapter asks, in what respect does deconstruction constitute a qualified form of critique? Drucilla Cornell raises the same question in the field of critical legal studies, and she refers to Emmanuel Levinas in order to answer it. The chapter begins to outline a different response by contesting Cornell’s position that deconstruction qualifies as “responsible critique.” It is argued that deconstruction challenges the very concept of responsibility on the basis of an appeal to the classic emancipatory ideal. The normativity of deconstruction is thus shown to hinge on how one understands the relationship between deconstruction and Levinasian ethics.
