ABSTRACT
Following the landslide victory of the Fidesz party in 2010, the new government, backed by a two-thirds majority in the parliament, started quickly transforming politics and to some extent the polity of Hungary as well. Due to the high international reputation of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, attacks against the Court became widely followed in the international scientific community. Several volumes and articles dealt with the transformation of constitutional adjudication after 2010, but no one focused on the question of whether the backlash against the Court had any ground in the practice of constitutional adjudication in Hungary. This chapter will explore to what extent the HCC has really constrained the room for manoeuvre of the legislator in Hungary after the democratic transformation process, and examine whether the narrative of a Court unduly entering the political field and, consequently, constraining too heavily the democratically elected parliamentary majority might prove true. We will argue that the practice of the HCC and its position within the system of separation of powers might be best described as a partner in a constitutional dialogue. In this position, the HCC signalized quite frequently that the legislator departed from the path of constitutionality but, at the same time, developed a highly refined instrumentarium not to constrain too heavily the legislator. Thus, the attitude of the court towards the legislator has been cooperative and partnerial rather than confrontative.
