ABSTRACT
The German Empire, Europe's pre-eminent military power, and on the road to economic and industrial supremacy, was content with a medium-sized navy, basically composed of coast-defence ironclads and cruisers. Max Weber's argument for a big navy, in support of the German navy law of 1898, reflects the zeitgeist of the 'age of empire'. Nationalism, imperialism, militarism, and Social Darwinism all fed, and in turn were further fuelled by, an active promotion of sea power, an outlook which came to be known as 'navalism'. Navalism, naval militarism, is the twin brother of militarism on land and bears all its repulsive and virulent features. The maritime aspects of the Franco-Prussian War rarely merit more than a mention in general histories of the conflict, because sea power did not materially affect the outcome. After 1870, the expansion of mass armies placed a heavy burden on defence budgets, and the distribution of resources between armies and navies was a major issue.
