ABSTRACT
Rachel's experiences of affect--her overwhelming experiences of terror, hate, annihilation, disintegration, hopelessness, and powerlessness-were clearly central to her difficulties. This chapter looks at the neurological underpinning of affect, and the division between the non-verbal and verbal self. It explores further the concept of the affective appraisal mechanism and relates the identity-affect model to the psychoanalytic view of affect, in particular, the difference between primary and secondary functioning. The chapter relates the split between the non-verbal and verbal self to the autonomy of affect, knowing and not-knowing, potency, and humility; and, finally, it provides an overview of the very important phenomenon of affect regulation. Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, and Target argue that the Aristotelian and Stoic attitudes can be reconciled in the two different systems of emotional response outlined by neuroscience, as in the model presented by LeDoux.
