ABSTRACT
This chapter describes the contributions from Pierre Jacob who broadly examines the relationships between stimulus and action on the basis of the Theory-of-Mind notion of a general capacity of attribution. Take for example the programme of emotional cognitivism, which replaces the processes of inference with processes of perception by maintaining that a feeling is the cognitive perception of an emotion. Sigmund Freud distinguishes with great precision between birth and what arises from the traumatic loss of the maternal object properly speaking. In Freudian terms, one invents one's symptom and one's fantasy by overcoming the anxiety of the loss of the mother, the anxiety "caused" by the mother. The signifier passes over to the function of an instrument of jouissance as a means of expression for the fantasy. Scott Atran presents a version of the "cognitive theory of culture" conceived of as a radical cultural nominalism: "culture per se" is not a well-defined entity nor is it a "super organism".
