ABSTRACT
Psychoanalysis as a regular science is no less momentous. Sigmund Freud held the position that psychoanalysis is a natural science. There are several fundamental presuppositions comprising the core of psychoanalysis as a scientific general theory of mind. A satisfactory account of symptoms, then—including phobias, other anxiety disorders, depression, obsessive compulsive behaviours, as well as the milder problems such as slips of the tongue and physical parapraxes. The argument begins with the acknowledgement of an initial assumption: that all scientific theories, methods and techniques have a discrete number of basic underlying and necessary presuppositions. After illustrating the case made by those who make the restrictive claim, the chapter presents counter-arguments. It provides a different philosophical model by which a-rational mentation could be understood as meaningful. The chapter demonstrates how, indeed, a-rational mentation does fit that new model. Nonetheless, Donald Davidson fashions a compromise solution with the use of what he considers psychoanalytic, Freudian-style concepts.
