ABSTRACT
Psychoanalytic explanations must be judged by the standards of normal scientific theory and established inductively through evidential support. In this chapter, the author argues that the senses in which the question of the scientific status of psychoanalysis has been “done to death” are superficial and inconsequential. After collation of the disparate material related to the charges against psychoanalysis, thematic analysis reveals that what seems at first sight to be an enormously complex, unwieldy and overwhelming amount of material can actually be grouped into a relatively small number of different categories. Given that psychoanalysis is indeed a collection of contingent statements, the question of the truth or falsity of those propositions, and the possible difficulties of determining the answer, are separate issues. When Adolf Grunbaum concludes that psychoanalysis is “scientifically alive” but “currently hardly well”. Accordingly, the most damaging accusation that can be levelled at any psychological theory is that it is “unscientific”.
