ABSTRACT
This chapter aims to mount a defence for unconscious mentality and the possibility of "unconscious knowing". It discusses J. Searle and V. Talvitie's arguments against unconscious mentality based on the concept of Intentionality. The chapter addresses Austrian philosopher Franz Brentano's specific thesis of the Intentionality of mental acts. It shows that within Brentano's account there is scope for coherently conceptualising unconscious mental processes and thus providing a foundation for understanding psychoanalytically relevant phenomena, such as unconscious fantasies and repressed mentality. The distinction between knowing and knowing that one knows also helps clarify apparent contradictions in discussions of unconscious and conscious mentality. Focusing upon what is or is not known in any situation allows clarifying discussions of unconscious processes and consciousness. Talvitie is making a fair point with respect to locating the repressed and unconscious mentality, and it is not difficult to find instances in the psychoanalytic literature where authors struggle with conceptualising and locating unconscious fantasies.
