ABSTRACT
We obviously need a new metapsychology, one that might account for the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and transpersonal phenomena that we contemplate, enquire, and try to understand. This chapter is an attempt to develop one possible model for such integration. Consequently, there came a wave of criticism of the more mechanical and static aspects of Freudian metapsychology, which were still enthusiastically adhered to by Ego Psychology and many orthodox Freudians. Sandor Ferenczi was quite aware of the difference between these two kinds of science, although he never openly criticised Freud’s metapsychology. Marjorie Brierley made a critical study of the traditional understanding of Freudian metapsychology, showing that it could better be thought in terms of mental processes, rather than mental entities. The chapter attempts to contribute to the development of a metapsychology that articulates individual and collective mental processes, which might allow an integration of the psychoanalytic and group-analytic approaches, theories, and therapeutic and research practices.
