ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses Adolf Grunbaum’s argument that psychoanalysis fails to meet the inductive criterion of demarcation. It describes that Grunbaum has accepted the inductive criterion of confirmation. Grunbaum’s attack on psychoanalysis is both extensive and intensive. The chapter presents Grunbaum’s argument related to the unreliability of clinical evidence. In psychoanalysis the word “insight” has been used in relation to the understanding of a causal mechanism, involving unconscious motivations, wishes, desires, which are responsible for giving rise to a problem behaviour or attitude. According to Grunbaum, the Tally Argument is the best defence of psychoanalysis against the suggestibility charge in the entire psychoanalytic literature. Even some prominent analysts have admitted that all round improvement in the personality of a patient has been brought about with rival therapies of psychoanalysis. With the demise of the Tally Argument, psychoanalysis faces an epistemic liability of enormous proportion.
