ABSTRACT
The fact that perversion is an ethical term–implying a moral bias–does not in the least imply that the concept must be consequently rejected by psychoanalysis. Classic psychoanalysis amorally looks at neurotic or perverse subjects as “moral objects”. According to Lacanians, perversions are ways to assure the enjoyment of the Other. Earlier, S. Freud had formulated a theory of perversions as “positive for neuroses” and of neuroses as “negative for perversions”. Sometimes, the very perversion can be just their “symptom”. Thus, perversion is basically hetero-dystonic: that is, it is in dystonia–even in the non-aggressive forms of masochism and fetishism–with what an actual other desires. In the history of psychoanalysis, perversions have assumed a huge theoretical relevance because, in thinking about fetishism, Freud had elaborated the notion of the “split of the ego” as a consequence of the disavowal of reality. In short, the non-perverse sexual act is one wherein one has caritas towards the other.
