ABSTRACT
Derk Pereboom understands hard determinism as 'the incompatibilist endorsement of determinism and rejection of the freedom required for moral responsibility'. Compatibilist accounts of autonomy-as-authenticity are therefore predicated by a confused understanding of one's abilities to act, whereas a naturalistic conception of autonomy is coextensive with a better understanding of, and adaptation to, one's natural environment. Accordingly, positive freedom – 'a capacity to commit oneself to certain principles of conduct as rationally binding' – is a necessary capacity for Kantian autonomy that is consistent with lacking free will. The question, then, is not whether the idea of free will deserves a place in education, but whether free will can be utilised as a valuable fiction rather than functioning as a false belief. The measure of the value of a fiction is the extent to which it moves us to act in ways that are conducive to our striving for self-preservation without inhibiting our overall understanding of ourselves and the world.
