ABSTRACT
Benedict de Spinoza's fictions are wilfully entertained placeholders of knowledge that one lacks. In the contemporary free will debate there is a similar – but importantly different – idea of free will as an illusion that, while metaphysically flawed, is deemed crucial for ability to live in a functioning moral community. Saul Smilansky describes his position vis-a-vis the free will problem as the position of Illusionism. Smilansky's notion of an illusion is equivalent to a false belief in that it concerns beliefs that are held as true while the content of the belief is false. Spinoza's vantage point allows formulating a theory that acknowledges the social and psychological force of the libertarian belief in free will, but instead of concluding that this belief should be endorsed and sustained indefinitely. It suggests that while free will may be a necessary false belief, it may also be utilised as a valuable fiction in education.
