ABSTRACT
It is a commonplace in the study of regulatory policy that, over time, watchdog agencies are 'captured' by the very groups they are meant to control, and end up serving interests very different from those originally intended. This chapter offers theoretical arguments to explain why the creeping universalism might occur. It then reviews empirical evidence from Australia to suggest that it is indeed occurring, even in one of the more vigorously means-tested social security systems in the developed world. Bureaucrats are said to be notorious empire-builders because they are self-interestedly trying to maximize budgets, personal perks or power; or it may be because they are committed to their agency's mission and are trying to further it. There are two ways in which political pressures might be thought to lead to the non-poor's infiltration of social welfare programmes. One way to attract the electoral support of median voters is by promising expenditure programmes that benefit them.
