ABSTRACT
This chapter provides a comprehensive explanation of why the US invasion of Iraq was a strategic mistake and accounts for the many tactical errors that were made in its implementation. The strategic mistake of going to war with Iraq resulted from President Bush's miscalculation that the transition to stability and democracy in the aftermath of the invasion would be relatively easy. The neoconservative push to invade Iraq was driven by a number of policy objectives. The neoconservative vision failed to take account of Iraqi culture and society and underestimated the influence of Iran. The ethnic, religious, and tribal divisions in Iraq were bound to become a source of instability once the repressive central government was toppled. In addition to provoking a backlash, the war in Iraq also drew resources away from other fronts in the US war on terror. The tactics and skills used by the insurgents in Iraq are testimony to the Guards' central involvement in the insurgency.
