ABSTRACT
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States strategically prioritized its fight against transnational jihadist organizations, especially al-Qa'ida and the organization it birthed in Iraq, the Islamic State. Despite ISIS's significant territorial losses, jihadists now enjoy more geographic safe havens than they possessed at the time of the 9/11 attacks. This chapter explores the post-9/11 history of the United States' engagement with jihadist actors: the fight against al-Qa'ida; the explosive growth of Salafi jihadism following the Arab uprisings; ISIS's birth as an independent organization; and the resulting skirmish between al-Qa'ida and ISIS for dominance over the jihadist movement. Prisoner releases were, of course, not uniformly bad, as the Arab dictatorships were notorious for unjustly incarcerating and abusing political prisoners. The Ramadan offensive bore the hallmark of the Amn al-Kharji, the Islamic State's secretive external operations wing, which is responsible for planning espionage activities and terrorist operations outside the caliphate's core territory.
