ABSTRACT
In Kant’s aesthetics, the sublime is no less important than beauty, but it cannot be easily identified because of its unique nature in the Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment and the complex construction of Kant’s argument. This chapter clarifies the logical construction and functional position of the sublime in Kant’s philosophy by contrasting his description of the sublime with those of both beauty and moral feeling. The sublime can be illustrated as a mixture of intuition and exhibition, a turn from sensibility to reason, and a combination of contemplation and movement. I begin by discussing the implication of the four moments in a judgment of the sublime, comparing them with Kant’s theory of the four moments in a judgment of taste, in order to clarify in what way judgments of the sublime belong to pure aesthetic judgment. I then explain the distinctions between the mathematical sublime and the dynamical sublime and their penetration into each other. Finally, I present the connection and differences between the sublime and moral feeling, which allows me to distinguish the sublime from the latter.
