ABSTRACT
I begin with a synopsis of my view on the role of intuition in Kant’s answer to the question of how cognition of synthetic a priori propositions is possible. Kant famously argues that we cannot have cognition of things in themselves and that we cannot have cognition of what he calls the supersensible, including God, our souls, and our freedom. I move from a consideration of these theoretical issues to examine Kant’s claims, in the second Critique and elsewhere, that we can cognize freedom through practical reason, and that this provides rational grounds for belief in God and the immortality of our souls. While intuition is a crucial ingredient in all theoretical cognition, Kant portrays practical cognition as occurring without intuition. Both theoretical and practical cognition have concepts, the other central ingredient in theoretical cognition, so something in practical reason must take the place of intuition. I conclude by reflecting on whether there is some equivalent to intuition in practical cognition, given the absence of sensible intuition there, and positively assess the plausibility of Mou Zongsan’s claim that something like intellectual intuition must be at work, at least in the practical realm, though not in the theoretical, as Mou claimed.
