ABSTRACT
In this chapter, the author provides a deeper view of the Problem of Universals. He begins by discussing an extreme form of Nominalism. One reason that many philosophers have had for preferring Nominalist to Realist theories is that Nominalism, by getting rid of types, appears to yield a more economical theory. If Class Nominalism is a true theory, then there ought to be a one-one correlation between classes and types. The assumption, then, is that some classes are better than others, that there is an objective distinction in the world between natural and nonnatural classes, a distinction that admits of degree. A variant of Predicate Nominalism is Concept Nominalism, in which the concept, something in people's minds, is substituted for the word 'white'. The author also provides a discussion on different theories of natural classes: natural classes as primitives, resemblance nominalism, universals, natural classes of tropes, resemblance classes of tropes, and tropes plus universals.
