ABSTRACT
This conclusion presents some closing thoughts on the concepts covered in the preceding chapters of this book. The book brings the matter to a conclusion that metaphysicians should not expect any certainties in their inquiries. The group of arguments of which Wolterstorff's argument from the identity conditions of classes may stand as a representative seems to create great difficulties for the Natural Class theory. Brushing aside the uneconomical view that admits both tropes and universals, there is a choice in Trope theory between natural class and resemblance views. The same sort of consideration that favors resemblances rather than natural classes of "regular" particulars seems to favor a Trope theory with resemblance. A Resemblance theory must treat the identities as a mere metaphysical coincidence between the properties of resemblance and the properties of identity. Therefore, the fate of the Universals theory may turn on the questions of the inexact resemblance of universals and of the nature of laws.
