ABSTRACT
Should the United States shun all dialogue with terrorists? Does talking with terrorists confer upon them an unmerited legitimacy? Are there differences among terrorist groups such that talking to some (though perhaps not others) might be both morally acceptable and productive toward conflict resolution? Mark Perry distinguishes so-called terrorist groups from mere terrorist networks. The former seek to participate in elections, are answerable to some degree to the constituencies that elect them, and frequently supply to those constituencies social services that governments too often fail to provide. They also have to reach some kind of governing accommodation with other groups who participate in power structures. That is, they have learned to negotiate. Terrorist networks, on the other hand, are answerable to no one. By that definition, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Muslim Brotherhood, though occasionally militant and even brutal, are (arguably) comparatively moderate, pro-democracy organizations to be distinguished from the radical likes of al-Qaeda. In conversations with leaders of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), Perry found that the movement no longer seeks to displace entirely the state of Israel but now instead limits its territorial ambitions to the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem. Hamas ran a slate in the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections, attentive to participating peacefully and democratically but also concerned that the United States would undermine the very elections it had promoted once it realized that Hamas had legitimately won. Indeed, according to the Hamas leaders, postelection pressures from America ignited the dispute between the victorious Hamas and the rival Fatah faction that left Hamas in control of Gaza, while Fatah governs the West Bank. Hezbollah is labeled a dangerous terrorist organization by the United States, primarily because of its opposition to Israel and its connections to Iran and Syria. Objectively, however, Hezbollah has cultivated a separation (though not utter independence) from both Iran and Syria and has conducted itself as a distinctly Lebanese political movement. In that capacity, it participates in government and reaches across sectarian divides to recruit political allies, including Christian parties. It is, Perry says, “a statelike actor within a nonstate.”
