ABSTRACT
The readiness of many leaders—from Moi in Kenya to Mobutu in Zaire—to deliberately exacerbate differences goes much further toward explaining why violence erupts than does mere reference to traditional rivalry. Mobutu Sese Seko’s failure to control Zaire’s transition away from Mobutism in the 1990s was derived as much from the institutions with which he had repressed the country and its people for twenty-five years as it was from his capacity to manipulate tradition. Unlike Mobutu, Daniel arap Moi had rarely voiced any clear idea of how he envisaged Kenya developing. Kenya’s shift to multiparty politics in late 1991 emerged as a result of the most intense pressure exerted on any of the one-party states of sub-Saharan Africa by domestic opposition, foreign governments, and multilateral financial donors. Vital to Mobutu’s success at manipulation and the continued assertion of his role as arbiter—the eagle king high above the toads—was the readiness of erstwhile opponents to be lured back into his camp.
