ABSTRACT
Hume argues for mind-body Dualism by using a version of the Properties argument, which we have seen Descartes using. But Hume's version is much more plausible. Hume is arguing that mental phenomena lack spatial position and spatial extension, and are therefore not material. Like Descartes, Hume accepts mind-body interaction, even though the things that interact are, according to him and Descartes, utterly different and even though their interaction is of a quite unique type. Unlike Descartes, however, Hume does not see this interaction between immaterial mind and material body as any sort of problem. Hume may be thought of as widening Berkeley's attack to include spiritual substance. Hume holds that the mental and the physical are distinct and do not overlap; and that the mental is nothing but bundles of 'perceptions'. Hume's 'perceptions' are similar to what later philosophers called 'sense-data'.
