ABSTRACT
The founding of the Identity theory is associated with the names of U. T. Place, J. J. C. Smart, and Herbert Feigl. Feigl's view is not quite the same as that of Place and Smart—it is not as hard-line in its materialism. This chapter focuses on Place and Smart. Place begins his article by indicating his sympathy with Physicalism. He cannot bring himself to accept the view, which we have seen in Descartes, Hume, and Huxley, that the mental is a distinct realm from the physical. Smart enlarges on this step of the argument. He says: "Science is increasingly giving us a viewpoint whereby organisms are able to be seen as physico-chemical mechanisms". Place sets out to advance an inner-mental-process Materialism by a defensive operation, by trying to show that it is an intelligible and non-self-contradictory thesis. Smart does pay it some attention in "Sensations and Brain Processes".
