ABSTRACT

There were the difficulties of avoiding appearing weak, the potential problems of going back on a publicly stated position, and there was the inability of those with the will to cease fire to persuade or coerce the ultimate decision makers that cease-fire was desirable. To these may now be added a fourth difficulty: a perceived or actual inability to cease fire. During the Iran-Iraq war, and although Iraq appeared to have a genuine interest in a cease-fire for most of the war, its proposals in almost all cases failed to include Iran's own conditions and interests for cease-fire. The desire to avoid sacrificing vital interests simply overrode the desire for cease-fire. First, it is almost certain that Iraq wanted to cease fire, even within the first weeks of the war, and on many occasions subsequently. Then, having appeared to have gained what territory it wanted by 2 October, Iraq announced that it would cease-fire unilaterally from 5-8 October.