ABSTRACT
If ethical propositions are not made true by natural facts, then maybe they concern a supernatural realm. Perhaps, contrary to metaphysical naturalism, there are supernatural facts, and maybe ethical facts are identical with some of these. This chapter considers one such possibility namely, that ethical facts concern the will of God. Like naturalist metaethics, an ethical supernaturalism can take either a reductive or a nonreductive form. Critics of the divine command theory have frequently pointed out that if all ethical facts depend on God's will, then it is impossible to think that one should obey God because of His goodness, since that would require us to think that God's goodness is independent of His command. Theological voluntarism mirrors, in various ways, the structure of reductive naturalism. The major problem facing theological voluntarism is one that faces any reductive theory, whether naturalist or supernaturalist namely, normativity.
