ABSTRACT
The author looks at Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind through a particular window. He reads him as taking persons and their doings as a given, and answering the question "What is mind?" by pointing to the amalgam of people's sayings and doings as they lead their lives. A meaning of a word is a kind of employment of it. For it is what we learn when the word is incorporated into our language. Games, rules, and following rules go together; where there are language-games, we can expect rules and the following of rules, too. Wittgenstein formulates each point in the course of his investigations as he responds to one or another reason that a philosopher might give for urging that there are mental processes. Despite objections to the possibility of private objects, someone who favors a private language might nonetheless say, "But still couldn't I have my own private language that I used to talk to myself about inner things?".
