ABSTRACT
Gilbert Ryle and Wittgenstein are the cosources of personism. Given their friendship in the 1930s and given the compatibility of their aims in the philosophy of mind, speculation about Ryle's debt to Wittgenstein is understandable. Ryle differs from Wittgenstein in his key philosophical device, the appeal to dispositions. Ryle finds mind in the careful or careless practices of individuals. Wittgenstein and Ryle share an important aim: to dispel the notion of the mind as a private inner chamber that shelters those philosophers' darlings—mental contents, mental events, mental causes, and mental acts. Ryle published two statements of his appreciation of Wittgenstein. Writing in 1951, he concluded one of them by noting a link between Wittgenstein and G. E. Moore: We have learnt to pay deliberate attention to what can and cannot be said.
