ABSTRACT

The government's military and civil presence was almost entirely restricted to the district capital and the Roman Catholic community to the west. The Saigon government's ability to preserve the gains of the accelerated pacification campaign (APC) remained moot with the departure of the United States 9th Division in July 1969. To Abrams, the APC represented an opportunity to go after the infrastructure and enemy local forces. The questionable performance of local government officials and forces caused Bernard to fear that the continued presence of American soldiers was required to maintain security and preserve the gains of the APC. The Americans criticized these forces for operating independently, overplanning, and then slavishly adhering to plans. American units participated in a significant number of joint operations with South Vietnamese army, police, and territorial forces to clear enemy forces and secure populated areas. Improving the army's support of pacification would require continuing proselytizing by General Abrams.