ABSTRACT
In his essay "From Rationality to Equality," James Sterba offers a vindication of morality that is quite different from other vindications in the philosophical literature. A vindication of morality could succeed only by relying on judgments that we find plausible, even though we could invent less plausible alternatives that aren't self-defeating in their own terms. Sterba, then, addresses his vindication to those capable of acting both for prudential and for other-regarding reasons. Sterba speaks of "altruistic" reasons. Strictly speaking, altruism is concern for the good of others, and Sterba clearly adopts this reading. Sterba makes clear in a note that he is using the term "altruistic" in the strict sense. By "morality as compromise," he tells us, he means a compromise between egoism and altruism, a compromise that weighs in both kinds of reasons. Sterba speaks of one form of morality as a compromise between egoism and altruism.
