ABSTRACT
The Oslo accord, though an important breakthrough, is but one part of the ongoing saga of the Arab-Israeli peace process. Its special character, however, offers a number of important lessons for putative peacemakers charged with taking those next tentative yet crucial steps down the road to a comprehensive regional settlement. Some Israeli negotiators in Washington, upset that their own government circumvented them by conducting secret talks in Oslo, privately believe that Israel could have achieved a better deal by negotiating directly with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the framework of the formal Washington talks. Informal sessions offer the important additional advantage of avoiding media scrutiny—and thus public wrangling—during the course of negotiations. In overt negotiations, the progress of which is generally reported by the press, both sides thrive on ambiguity and deferring difficult problems. Negotiators therefore tend to play to the home crowd by spouting uncompromising opening positions.
