ABSTRACT
Like Vietnam long before it, Somalia has become a "syndrome," held by many to have been a naive attempt to implement benevolent interventionism in a marginal Third World state and doomed to failure. Inability or unwillingness to discern the essential political dynamics of the country and to effect remedial measures to foster civil society-out of expedience, disinterest, or naive "neutrality"-lie at the root of the world's failure in Somalia. The initial intervening force in Somalia avoided the establishment of a political agenda for its actions. A decentralized zonal approach for the UN intervention in Somalia was mandated. Accommodation mixed with persuasion remained the underlying philosophy of the UN operation. By mid-1992, thanks to a media aroused by angry humanitarian groups that pointed to the starvation in central Somalia, the drastic humanitarian problems of Somalia were well known. General Aideed's continued truculence called for more resolute action.
