ABSTRACT
Philosophical description can often be confused with sociological or anthropological description. The ways of thinking in which the basic propositions are held fast are not themselves founded on anything more ultimate than themselves. Once philosophy has shown the fundamental roles played by basic propositions in our ways of thinking, its task is over. In showing how talk of the possibility of being mistaken in these contexts cannot get a foothold, Wittgenstein is not suggesting that our ways of thinking are optional for us. In his reply to the paper, Colin Lyas criticises Malcolm for suggesting that all groundless belief is religious belief. Malcolm is wanting to show no more than Lyas says he could show, legitimately, namely, 'Religious belief and belief in the Law of Induction have a feature in common, namely, they are groundless'. When Malcolm speaks of the 'religious' sense of belief he is referring only to the groundless aspect of the believing in this context.
