ABSTRACT
This chapter considers the use of J. L. Austin's speech-act theory by James Wm. McClendon Jr. and James M. Smith to address problems concerning religious language. It argues that a principal value of the Austinian understanding of religious language is that it overcomes the dichotomy between the referential and expressivist functions of language, thus offering a way ahead beyond the modern liberal and conservative positions. The chapter highlights a new problem for philosophers of religion that arises from misunderstandings about language—and one that will be at least as devastating to Christian self-understanding if not answered. This is the problem of the instability of textual meaning—that is, relativism with regard to textual interpretation. These relativistic views have arisen as but one aspect of a general skeptical reaction to the demise of foundationalism in epistemology. The chapter argues that a solution is already at hand in the works of none other than Austin and McClendon.
