ABSTRACT
Many philosophers now admit cases of indeterministic causation. This chapter shows how far people can get in constructing an indeterminist model of free will without making appeal to agent-causation as an irreducible notion. The best freedom-enhancing place to locate the indeterminism is just prior to the formation of the preference concerning what to do. The chapter describes that in the case of free action, certain considerations cause without determining the formation of a particular preference concerning what to do. Insofar as indeterminacy is associated with chaos and randomness, indeterminism seems not to be positively antithetical to it. Carl Ginet might contend in response that a mental event compelled by a "freakish demon" is not uncaused and so cannot count as the volition crucial to the account of free action. According to Ginet's account, at the core of every complex bodily free action is a simple mental act, a volition, that is itself uncaused.
