ABSTRACT
In this chapter, the author looks at Harry Frankfurt's attack on Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) from a libertarian viewpoint. He takes 'a given act A' in PAP to refer to an action such that the agent was aware, at the time, that Frankfurt was performing it and with regard to which he believed that he could have done otherwise. The version of libertarianism the author intend to defend is the view that an agent's decision (choice) is free in the sense of freedom required for moral responsibility only if it is not causally determined, and in the circumstances in which the agent made that decision (choice), Frankfurt could have avoided making it. The author adopts a finegrained account of action individuation, and shall treat 'A' in PAP as a variable for actions themselves, rather than actions under A-descriptions. He concludes that Frankfurt's attack on PAP as applied to decisions fails.
