ABSTRACT
This chapter provides a coherent characterization of the phenomena that are the target of the talk of identification. The important point is the substantive claim that identification involves decisions that concern in part our desires. Decisions, as understood by Harry Frankfurt, always concern, at least in part, desires of the agent. In his presidential address Frankfurt gives up this effort to see identification as a kind of decision. His reason there seems similar in spirit to the reason suggested by J. David Velleman's example. The decision in Velleman's example is a decision to (execute the desire to) sever the friendship. The unwitting decision to which Velleman alludes is first-order: it is a decision to sever the friendship. Frankfurt might insist it is merely a choice and so does not challenge his point about decisions. Frankfurt considers a related issue in his discussion of satisfaction. Reflective satisfaction, while reflective, is nevertheless a "non-occurrence".
