ABSTRACT
This chapter provides somewhat far-reaching assumptions about the self or the agent—about the man who performs the act. The metaphysical problem of human freedom might be summarized in the following way: Human beings are responsible agents; but this fact appears to conflict with a deterministic view of human action; and it also appears to conflict with an indeterministic view of human action. The objection takes the form of a stratagem—one designed to show that determinism (and divine providence) is consistent with human responsibility. The stratagem is one that was used by Jonathan Edwards and by many philosophers in the present century, most notably, G. E. Moore. The chapter considers some deed, or misdeed, that may be attributed to a responsible agent. Aristotle said that the activity of the prime mover is nothing in addition to the motion that it produces, and Suarez said that 'the action is in reality nothing but the effect as it flows from the agent'.
