ABSTRACT
Recent theoretical and methodological developments within the study of hermeneutics have hitherto largely neglected the strong normative strands of ethical studies within the Islamic tradition. This paper examines the origins of rational argumentation in aš-Šāṭibī’s concept of the common good from a hermeneutical perspective and discusses its significance. From ʾImām al-Ḥaramayn (d. 478/1085) we may infer that the first substantial point of conflict between rational and textual approaches within the legal tradition was analogical argumentation to deduce maṣlaḥa (“the good”). Zahirit’s decision to eliminate analogical deduction from legal reasoning contributed to the elaboration of a singular and unique conception of maṣlaḥa within the maqāṣid legal tradition, and more specifically in the context of Šāṭibī’s theory of ethics. After a brief chronology of the process of rational argumentation within legal tradition, this paper considers some general reasons why the maqāṣid concepts of rationality were appropriate for an exhaustive definition of maṣlaḥa within the framework of Islamic moral theory.
