ABSTRACT
This chapter is a threadbare analysis of the widely quoted Basic Structure Doctrine which had its roots in a series of judicial pronouncements since the beginning of India’s journey as a liberal democratic polity. What is argued here is the point that under no circumstances, the fundamental features of the Constitution can be bypassed. There are two important issues that the chapter is devoted to analyse: on the one hand, it concentrates on how the Basic Structure Doctrine emerged as a shield of constitutional democracy in India; there is also the argument that the chapter raises, on the other, by dwelling on what is defined as ’judicial over-reach’ in areas that exclusively belongs to the executive. By reference to the critical judicial pronouncements, the chapter shows how judiciary plays an important role in shaping India’s constitutional identity as a constitutional democracy. By insisting on the basic structure, the Supreme Court thus acts as a brake which is required to sustain a healthy balance among the organs of the government. Besides imposing limits on parliament’s amending power, the doctrine also acknowledges that the Constitution can be radically changed by the people themselves; it thus emphasizes simultaneously the importance of the elected representatives and ’the democratic pedigree earned by non-representative institutions’, including judiciary. The trajectory of the basic structure doctrine confirms that it evolves and gets consolidated when the representative institutions fail to ‘maintain democratic essentials’ of the country. Hence, the importance of the doctrine cannot be so easily dismissed; in fact, it has gained credibility to the extent of being part and parcel of constitutional democracy in India.
