ABSTRACT
Twentieth-century work on mental causation has undergone radical shifts in the very approach to the problem — from returning to the 17th-century debates about the tenability of dualism, to rejecting the problem all together as a pseudo-problem, to finally returning to it again with unparalleled interest. Indeed, the history of the mental causation debates in this century has unfolded with ever greater drama, as the end of the century has brought into focus not just one, but many, distinct problems of mental causation, each posing unique threats to its very possibility. More attractive were epiphenomenalism, panpsychism, and emergentism, the main positions on mental causation in the early 20th century. The mental causation debate, while lively in the early 20th century, came to a halt in the mid-20th century, when a core assumption shared by rival materialist accounts of mental causation came under close scrutiny.
